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Abstract
The paper addresses some major implications of microelectromechanical
systems (MEMS) engineering and nanotechnology for the improvement of
existing types of nuclear weapons, and the development of more robust ver-
sions of these weapons, as well as for the development of fourth generations
nuclear weapons in which nanotechnology will play an essential role.
1 Introduction
In Disarmament Diplomacy No. 65, Sean Howard warned of the dangers of en-
hanced or even new types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) emerging from
the development of ‘nanotechnology’, an umbrella term for a range of poten-
tially revolutionary engineering techniques at the atomic and molecular level [1].
Howard called for urgent preliminary consideration to be given to the benefits
and practicalities of negotiating an ‘inner space treaty’ to guard against such
developments. While echoing this call, this paper draws attention to the existing
potential of nanotechnology to affect dangerous and destabilizing ‘refinements’
to existing nuclear weapon designs. Historically, nanotechnology is a child of
the nuclear weapons labs, a creation of the WMD-industrial complex. The most
far-reaching and fateful impacts of nanotechnology, therefore, may lie — and can
already be seen — in the same area.
Sean Howard, Editor
∗Published in Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 67 (October-November 2002) 3–6. Slightly ex-
panded version with a few additional end-notes and references.
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2 The Strategic Context
Two important strategic lessons were taught by the last three wars in which the
full extent of Western military superiority was displayed: Iraq, Yugoslavia, and
Afghanistan. First, the amount of conventional explosive that could be delivered
by precision-guided munitions like cruise missiles is ridiculous in comparison to
their cost: some targets could only be destroyed by the expenditure of numerous
delivery systems while a single one loaded with a more powerful warhead would
have been sufficient [2]. Second, the use of weapons producing a low level of
radioactivity appears to be acceptable, both from a military point of view because
such a level does not impair further military action, and from a political standpoint
because most political leaders, and shapers of public opinion, did not object
to the battlefield use of depleted uranium [3]. These lessons imply a probable
military perception of the need for new conventional or nuclear warheads, and
a probable political acceptance of such warheads if they do not produce large
amounts of residual radioactivity. Moreover, during and after these wars, it was
often suggested that some new earth-penetrating weapon was needed to destroy
deeply buried command posts, or facilities related to weapons of mass destruction
[4].
It is not, therefore, surprising to witness the emergence of a well-funded
scientific effort apt to create the technological basis for making powerful new
weapons — an effort that is not sold to the public opinion and political leaders
as one of maintaining a high level of military superiority, but rather as one of
extending human enterprise to the next frontier: the inner space of matter to be
conquered by the science of nanotechnology.
3 The Military Impact of Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology, i.e., the science of designing microscopic structures in which the
materials and their relations are machined and controlled atom-by-atom, holds the
promise of numerous applications. Lying at the crossroads of engineering, physics,
chemistry, and biology, nanotechnology may have considerable impact in all areas
of science and technology. However, it is certain that the most significant near
term applications of nanotechnology will be in the military domain. In fact, it is
under the names of ‘micromechanical engineering’ and ‘microelectromechanical
systems’ (MEMS) that the field of nanotechnology was born a few decades ago
— in nuclear weapons laboratories.
A primary impetus for creating these systems was the need for extremely
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rugged and safe arming and triggering mechanisms for nuclear weapons such
as atomic artillery shells. In such warheads, the nuclear explosive and its trigger
undergo extreme acceleration (10,000 times greater than gravity when the munition
is delivered by a heavy gun). A general design technique is then to make the
trigger’s crucial components as small as possible [5]. For similar reasons of
extreme safety, reliability, and resistance to external factors, the detonators and
the various locking mechanisms of nuclear weapons were increasingly designed
as more and more sophisticated microelectromechanical systems. Consequently,
nuclear weapons laboratories such as the Sandia National Laboratory in the US are
leading the world in translating the most advanced concepts of MEMS engineering
into practice [6].
A second historical impetus for MEMS and nanotechnology, one which is also
over thirty years old, is the still ongoing drive towards miniaturization of nuclear
weapons and the related quest for very-low yield nuclear explosives which could
also be used as a source of nuclear energy in the form of controlled microexplo-
sions. Such explosions (with yields in the range of a few kilograms to a few tons
of high-explosive equivalent) would in principle be contained but they could just
as well be used in weapons if suitable compact triggers are developed. In this line
of research, it was soon discovered that it is easier to design a micro-fusion than
a micro-fission explosive (which has the further advantage of producing much
less radioactive fallout than a micro-fission device of the same yield). Since that
time enormous progress has been made, and the research on these micro-fusion
bombs has now become the main advanced weapons research activity of the nu-
clear weapons laboratories, using gigantic tools such as the US National Ignition
Facility (NIF) and France’s Laser Me´gajoule. The tiny pellets used in these ex-
periments, containing the thermonuclear fuel to be exploded, are certainly among
the most delicate and sophisticated nano-engineered devices in existence.
A third major impetus for nanotechnology is the growing demand for better ma-
terials (and parts made of them) with extremely well characterized specifications.
These can be new materials such as improved insulators which will increase the
storage capacity of capacitors used in detonators, nano-engineered high-explosives
for advanced weaponry, etc. But they can also be conventional materials of ex-
treme purity, or nano-engineered components of extreme precision. For instance,
to meet NIF specifications, the 2-mm-diameter fuel pellets must not be more than
1 micrometer out of round; that is, the radius to the outer surface can vary by no
more than 1 micrometer (out of 1,000) as one moves across the surface. Moreover,
the walls of these pellets consist of layers whose thicknesses are measured in
fractions of micrometers, and surface-smoothnesses in tens of nanometers; thus,
these specifications can be given in units of 1,000 or 100 atoms, so that even
minute defects have to be absent for the pellets to implode symmetrically when
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illuminated by the lasers.
The final major impetus for MEMS and nanotechnology, which has the greatest
overlap with non-military needs, is their promise of numerous new very-high
performance sensors, transducers, actuators, and electronic components. The
development of this field of applications is expected to replicate that of the micro-
electronic industry, which was also originally driven by military needs, and which
provides the reference for forecasting a nano-industrial boom and a financial
bonanza. There are, however, two major differences. First, electronic devices
which can manufactured in large quantities and at low cost are essentially planar,
while MEMS are three-dimensional devices which may include moving parts.
Second, the need for MEMS outside professional circles (medical, scientific,
police, military) is quite limited, so that the market might not be as wide as
expected. For example, the detection and identification of chemical or biological
weapon threats through specificity of molecular response may lead to all sorts of
medical applications, but only to few consumers goods.
4 Near- and Long-Term Applications and Implica-
tions of Nanotechnology
Considering that nanotechnology is already an integral part of the development of
modern weapons, it is important to realize that its immediate potential to improve
existing weapons (either conventional or nuclear), and its short-term potential to
create new weapons (either conventional or nuclear), are more than sufficient to
require the immediate attention of diplomats and arms controllers. In this perspec-
tive, the potential long-term applications of nanotechnology (and their foreseeable
social and political implications) should neither be downplayed nor overempha-
sized. Indeed, there are potential applications such as self-replicating nano-robots
(‘nanobots’) which may never prove to be feasible because of fundamental phys-
ical or technical obstacles [7]. But this impossibility would not mean that the
somewhat larger micro-robots of the type that are seriously considered in military
laboratories could never become a reality [8].
In light of these extant and potential dangers and risks, every effort should be
made not to repeat the error of the arms-control community with regard to missile
defense. For over thirty years, that community acted on the premise that a ballistic
missile defense system will never be built because it will never be sufficiently
effective — only to be faced with a concerted attempt to construct such a system!
If some treaty is contemplated in order to control or prohibit the development of
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nanotechnology, it should be drafted in such a way that all reasonable long-term
applications are covered.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that while nanotechnology mostly em-
phasizes the spatial extension of matter at the scale of the nanometer (the size of
a few atoms), the time dimension of mechanical engineering has recently reached
its ultimate limit at the scale of the femtosecond (the time taken by an electron
to circle an atom). It has thus become possible to generate bursts of energy in
suitably packaged pulses in space and time that have critical applications in nan-
otechnology, and to focus pulses of particle or laser beams with extremely short
durations on a few micrometer down to a few nanometer sized targets. The in-
vention of the ‘superlaser’, which enabled such a feat and provided a factor of
one million increase in the instantaneous power of tabletop lasers, is possibly the
most significant recent advance in military technology. This increase is of the
same magnitude as the factor of one million difference in energy density between
chemical and nuclear energy [9].
In the present paper, the long-term impact of nanotechnology will not be further
discussed. The objective is to emphasize the near to short-term applications to
existing and new types of nuclear weapons.
5 Nanotechnological Improvement of Existing Types
of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapon technology is characterized by two sharply contrasting demands.
On the one hand, the nuclear package containing the fission and fusion materials
is relatively simple and forgiving, i.e., rather more sophisticated than complicated.
On the other hand, the many ancillary components required for arming the weapon,
triggering the high-explosives, and initiating the neutron chain-reaction, are much
more complicated. Moreover, the problems related to maintaining political control
over the use of nuclear weapons, i.e., the operation of permissive action links
(PALs), necessitated the development of protection systems that are meant to
remain active all the way to the target, meaning that all these ancillary components
and systems are submitted to very stringent requirements for security, safety, and
reliable performance under severe conditions.
The general solution to these problems is to favor the use of hybrid com-
binations of mechanical and electronic systems, which have the advantage of
dramatically reducing the probability of common mode failures and decreasing
sensitivity to external factors. It is this search for the maximization of reliability
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and ruggedness which is driving the development and application of nanotechnol-
ogy and MEMS engineering in nuclear weapons science. To give an important
example: modern nuclear weapons use insensitive high-explosives (IHE) which
can only be detonated by means of a small charge of sensitive high-explosive that
is held out of alignment from the main charge of IHE. Only once the warhead
is armed does a MEMS bring the detonator into position with the main charge
[10, p.31]. Since the insensitive high-explosive in a nuclear weapon is usually
broken down into many separate parts that are triggered by individual detonators,
the use of MEMS-based detonators incorporating individual locking mechanisms
are an important ingredient ensuring the use-control and one-point safety of such
weapons [11].
Further improvements on existing nuclear weapons are stemming from the
application of nanotechnology to materials engineering. New capacitors, new
radiation-resistant integrated circuits, new composite materials capable to with-
stand high temperatures and accelerations, etc., will enable a further level of
miniaturization and a corresponding enhancement of safety and usability of nu-
clear weapons. Consequently, the military utility and the possibility of forward
deployment, as well as the potentiality for new missions, will be increased.
Consider the concept of a “low-yield” earth penetrating warhead [12]. The
military appeal of such a weapon derives from the inherent difficulty of destroying
underground targets. Only about 15% of the energy from a surface explosion is
coupled (transferred) into the ground, while shock waves are quickly attenuated
when traveling through the ground. Even a few megatons surface burst will not be
able to destroy a buried target at a depth or distance more than 100 to 200 meters
away from ground zero. A radical alternative, therefore, is to design a warhead
which would detonate after penetrating the ground by a few tens of meters or more.
Since a free-falling or rocket-driven missile will not penetrate the surface by more
than about ten meters, some kind of active penetration mechanism is required.
This implies that the nuclear package and its ancillary components will have to
survive extreme conditions of stress until the warhead is detonated [13].
6 Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons
First and second generation nuclear weapons are atomic and hydrogen bombs
developed during the 1940s and 1950s, while third generation weapons comprise
a number of concepts developed between the 1960s and 1980s, e.g., the neutron
bomb, which never found a permanent place in the military arsenals. Fourth gen-
eration nuclear weapons are new types of nuclear explosives that can be developed
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in full compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) using inertial
confinement fusion (ICF) facilities such as the NIF in the US, and other advanced
technologies which are under active development in all the major nuclear-weapon
states — and in major industrial powers such as Germany and Japan [14, 15].
In a nutshell, the defining technical characteristic of fourth generation nuclear
weapons is the triggering — by some advanced technology such as a superlaser,
magnetic compression, nuclear isomers, antimatter [16], etc. — of a relatively
small thermonuclear explosion in which a deuterium-tritium mixture is burnt in a
device whose weight and size are not much larger than a few kilograms and liters.
Since the yield of these warheads could go from a fraction of a ton to many tens of
tons of high-explosive equivalent, their delivery by precision-guided munitions or
other means will dramatically increase the fire-power of those who possess them
— without crossing the threshold of using kiloton to megaton nuclear weapons,
and therefore without breaking the taboo against the first-use of weapons of mass-
destruction. Moreover, since these new weapons will use no (or very little)
fissionable materials, they will produce virtually no radioactive fallout. Their
proponents will define them as “clean” nuclear weapons — and possibly draw a
parallel between their battlefield use and the consequences of the expenditure of
depleted uranium ammunition [17].
In practice, since the controlled release of thermonuclear energy in the form of
laboratory scale explosions (i.e., equivalent to a few kilograms of high-explosives)
at ICF facilities like NIF is likely to succeed in the next 10 to 15 years, the main
arms-control question is how to prevent this know-how being used to manufacture
fourth generation nuclear weapons. As we have already seen, nanotechnology and
micromechanical engineering are integral parts of ICF pellet construction. But
this is also the case with ICF drivers and diagnostic devices, and even more so with
all the hardware that will have to be miniaturized and ‘ruggedized’ to the extreme
in order to produce a compact, robust, and cost-effective weapon.
A thorough discussion of the potential of nanotechnology and microelectrome-
chanical engineering in relation to the emergence of fourth generation nuclear
weapons is therefore of the utmost importance. It is likely that this discussion
will be difficult, not just because of secrecy and other restrictions, but mainly
because the military usefulness and usability of these weapons is likely to remain
very high as long as precision-guided delivery systems dominate the battlefield.
It is therefore important to realize that the technological hurdles that have to be
overcome in order for laboratory scale thermonuclear explosions to be turned into
weapons may be the only remaining significant barrier against the introduction and
proliferation of fourth generation nuclear weapons. For this reason alone —and
there are many others, beyond the scope of this paper — very serious consider-
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ation should be given to the possibility of promoting an ‘Inner Space Treaty’ to
prohibit the military development and application of nanotechnological devices
and techniques.
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